October 19, 2021

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Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of Defense

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<div>Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars in supplemental and annual appropriations for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DOD's reported annual obligations for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007. In fiscal year 2007, Congress provided DOD with about $161.8 billion in annual and supplemental appropriations3 for GWOT. To continue its GWOT operations, DOD has requested $189. billion in appropriations for fiscal year 2008. As of December 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $86.8 billion for GWOT in fiscal year 2008, including $16.8 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. DOD has reported obligations of about $23.8 billion for GWOT for fiscal year 2008 through November 2007. The United States' commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD's future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support GWOT in a monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future GWOT budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. The monthly cost reports are typically compiled in the 45 days after the end of the reporting month in which the obligations are incurred. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in GWOT since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD's monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD's reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through September 2007. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD's appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through fiscal year 2007 and (2) DOD's fiscal year 2007 reported obligations for GWOT by military service and appropriation account.From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $542.9 billion for its efforts in support of GWOT. DOD has reported obligations of about $492.2 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal years 2001 through 2007. The $50.7 billion difference between DOD's GWOT appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated, and obligations for classified activities, which are not included in DOD's reported obligations. DOD's total reported obligations related to GWOT have demonstrated a steady annual increase each fiscal year through 2007. DOD's reported obligations of about $139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007 were approximately 1.4 times higher than reported GWOT obligations of about $98.4 billion for fiscal year 2006. The higher reported obligations in fiscal year 2007 are largely due to costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, in part due to the surge strategy announced in January 2007, which provided for the deployment of additional troops. DOD's reported obligations through fiscal year 2007 include about $378.1 billion for operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and about $86.2 billion for operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and elsewhere as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It also includes about $27.9 billion for operations in defense of the homeland as part of Operation Noble Eagle. Reported obligations associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom continue to be far higher than those for other GWOT operations in fiscal year 2007. From fiscal years 2003 through 2007, DOD's reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom consistently increased each fiscal year. In contrast, DOD's reported obligations for Operation Noble Eagle have consistently decreased since fiscal year 2003, while those for Operation Enduring Freedom have remained within a range of $10.3 billion to $20.1 billion each fiscal year. DOD's reported obligations for fiscal year 2007 totaled $139.8 billion. The Army accounts for the largest proportion of reported obligations for fiscal year 2007--about $98.0 billion, nearly eight times higher than the almost $12.9 billion in obligations reported for the Air Force, the military service with the next greatest reported amount. Among appropriation accounts, operation and maintenance, which include items such as support for housing, food, and services; the repair of equipment; and transportation to move people, supplies, and equipment, accounts for the largest reported obligations--about $74.9 billion. Reported obligations for procurement account for about a quarter of total reported obligations or about $35.8 billion. Of the $43.6 billion provided to DOD for procurement in fiscal year 2007, approximately 34 percent or $14.3 billion, remained available for use in fiscal year 2008.</div>

Since 2001, Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars in supplemental and annual appropriations for military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DOD’s reported annual obligations for GWOT have shown a steady increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007. In fiscal year 2007, Congress provided DOD with about $161.8 billion in annual and supplemental appropriations3 for GWOT. To continue its GWOT operations, DOD has requested $189. billion in appropriations for fiscal year 2008. As of December 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $86.8 billion for GWOT in fiscal year 2008, including $16.8 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. DOD has reported obligations of about $23.8 billion for GWOT for fiscal year 2008 through November 2007. The United States’ commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal challenge. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect cost variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not yet been made. DOD’s future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. DOD compiles and reports monthly and cumulative incremental obligations incurred to support GWOT in a monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report. DOD leadership uses this report, along with other information, to advise Congress on the costs of the war and to formulate future GWOT budget requests. DOD reports these obligations by appropriation, contingency operation, and military service or defense agency. The monthly cost reports are typically compiled in the 45 days after the end of the reporting month in which the obligations are incurred. DOD has prepared monthly reports on the obligations incurred for its involvement in GWOT since fiscal year 2001. Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires us to submit quarterly updates to Congress on the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom based on DOD’s monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports. This report, which responds to this requirement, contains our analysis of DOD’s reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through September 2007. Specifically, we assessed (1) DOD’s appropriations and reported obligations for military operations in support of GWOT through fiscal year 2007 and (2) DOD’s fiscal year 2007 reported obligations for GWOT by military service and appropriation account.

From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $542.9 billion for its efforts in support of GWOT. DOD has reported obligations of about $492.2 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal years 2001 through 2007. The $50.7 billion difference between DOD’s GWOT appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to multiyear funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated, and obligations for classified activities, which are not included in DOD’s reported obligations. DOD’s total reported obligations related to GWOT have demonstrated a steady annual increase each fiscal year through 2007. DOD’s reported obligations of about $139.8 billion in fiscal year 2007 were approximately 1.4 times higher than reported GWOT obligations of about $98.4 billion for fiscal year 2006. The higher reported obligations in fiscal year 2007 are largely due to costs associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom, in part due to the surge strategy announced in January 2007, which provided for the deployment of additional troops. DOD’s reported obligations through fiscal year 2007 include about $378.1 billion for operations in and around Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and about $86.2 billion for operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and elsewhere as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It also includes about $27.9 billion for operations in defense of the homeland as part of Operation Noble Eagle. Reported obligations associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom continue to be far higher than those for other GWOT operations in fiscal year 2007. From fiscal years 2003 through 2007, DOD’s reported obligations for Operation Iraqi Freedom consistently increased each fiscal year. In contrast, DOD’s reported obligations for Operation Noble Eagle have consistently decreased since fiscal year 2003, while those for Operation Enduring Freedom have remained within a range of $10.3 billion to $20.1 billion each fiscal year. DOD’s reported obligations for fiscal year 2007 totaled $139.8 billion. The Army accounts for the largest proportion of reported obligations for fiscal year 2007–about $98.0 billion, nearly eight times higher than the almost $12.9 billion in obligations reported for the Air Force, the military service with the next greatest reported amount. Among appropriation accounts, operation and maintenance, which include items such as support for housing, food, and services; the repair of equipment; and transportation to move people, supplies, and equipment, accounts for the largest reported obligations–about $74.9 billion. Reported obligations for procurement account for about a quarter of total reported obligations or about $35.8 billion. Of the $43.6 billion provided to DOD for procurement in fiscal year 2007, approximately 34 percent or $14.3 billion, remained available for use in fiscal year 2008.

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  • Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed
    In U.S GAO News
    The Afghan government, the United States, and other donors consider road reconstruction a top development priority for Afghanistan. Almost 20 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) $5.9 billion in assistance to Afghanistan has been for roads. The Department of Defense (Defense) has committed about $560 million for roads, of which Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds account for over half. GAO examined (1) the status of road reconstruction and challenges affecting project implementation, (2) U.S. agencies' efforts to evaluate the impact of road projects, and (3) efforts to develop a sustainable road maintenance program. GAO reviewed U.S. and Afghan governments' planning, evaluation, and funding documents and interviewed relevant stakeholders in Afghanistan.The United States and other donors have completed construction of several regional and national highways since 2002, but the status of other roads is uncertain and various challenges have delayed construction. The Afghan government and international donors planned to complete the high-priority regional highways by the end of 2008, and as of February 2008, about 60 percent of these roads were built. USAID has completed its portion, but completion of other portions is not expected until late 2009. Donors have committed to construct over 30 percent of national highways, which connect provincial capitals to the regional highways, and only USAID has completed portions of these highways. Detailed information on the status of provincial and rural roads is lacking. Although Defense reported committing CERP funds for 1,600 kilometers of roads, data on the roads were incomplete and Defense has not reported information on these roads to USAID, as required. Poor security, project implementer limitations, and starting construction with limited planning have contributed to project delays and cost increases. U.S. agencies have not conducted sound impact evaluations to determine the degree to which projects achieved the objective of economic development. Limitations of USAID's funding, data collection, and frameworks to assess results have impeded its ability to evaluate project impact. Defense has not conducted any impact evaluations and lacks clear guidance on project evaluation. However, agency officials have noted some anecdotal examples of road construction impact, such as reduced travel times and increased commerce. Moreover, no other donor has performed impact evaluations. A sustainable road maintenance program has not been established, although it is a goal of the Afghan government and international donors. The Afghan government's support of this goal has been limited due to factors such as a lack of resources and a fragmented institutional organization. As a result, international donors have agreed to temporarily fund road maintenance to protect their investments. While USAID plans to maintain about 1,500 kilometers of roads it built, it did not meet its 2007 target to maintain 100 kilometers of reconstructed roads.
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